Tyranny of numbers

Later this week, on Friday, July 5, a diverse electorate faces a consequential choice for the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Voters differ in age, income and ethnicity, but more than any characteristic, age dominates the debate on social media. Masoud Pezeshkian, the candidate promising reform, who has attracted support from a wide array of reformists, is urged to woo the youth vote, the generation Z (ages 18-29). Conventional wisdom is that Pezeshkian’s sharp criticisms of the establishment and promises of greater social freedoms and no filtering of the internet have made the youth a decisive voting bloc that can push the challenger over the top.

Most commentators believe that this age group sat out the first round but can be a decisive factor in the second round, to be held in 4 days. But are they really such a large group? Iran’s electoral history supports the importance of the youth vote. They are credited with the surprise victory of the former reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, and were the backbone of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s unsuccessful run for president in 2009, which led to the largest protests against election fraud in Iran’s history. They were again the ones who celebrated Rouhani’s victories in 2013 and 2017 in Tehran’s streets. But much time passed since those events, creating a different demographic picture.

The share of youth in the voting population has dropped by almost half since Khatami’s 1997 election, from 39.2% to 20.8% (see table 1 below). Today youth aged 18-29 number about 12.8 million, of which at best 6 million can be persuaded to vote in the second round on Friday, and then may not vote for Pezeshkian. They are also much more educated (Table 2). The share of those with some university education increased from less than 10% in the 1990s to about a third in the 2020s.

The higher level of youth education also explains the main reason why they are hard to attract to the polls. Unlike in the rest of the world (but not so unlike the Middle East), university-educated youth have a high rate of unemployment, which makes them interested in emigration. What makes the Iranian youth particularly footloose and Iran no country for young people is the addition of social restrictions to the bad labor market conditions. Many of Iran’s best and brightest youth have long aimed at emigration and developing resumes that are appealing to western institutions of higher education, which serve as bridges to better lives outside Iran. No amount of promises in this very short election period is likely to overcome their pessimism about what elections can accomplish, a pessimism they have accumulated from electing reformist administrations in the past. For this reason Rouhani’s successful strategy of shifting to social issues days before the 2013 presidential election may not work as well in 2024.

And finally there is the cost of losing older voters drawn to Pezeshkian because of his stance on social justice who may stay home if he makes a hasty shift toward social issues at this late stage (he has made clear statements criticisizing the government’s enforcement of hijab and neglect of youth demands). The 30+ age group, which is nearly 50 million strong and accounts for 4 out of 5 votes, includes many who pressed for social reforms in the past, but today, with jobs and family responsibility, may be more interested in economic issues. For them, Pezeshkian’s promises to grow the economy with shared prosperity may be the most important reason why they would come to his support on July 5.